Extension of Proceedings Beyond the Original Parties: non-Disputing Party Participation in Investment Arbitration
eloïse Obadia* ThE sUBJECT OF ExTEnDInG PROCEEDInGs to include non-disputing parties 1 in investment arbitration is at first sight paradoxical. historically, arbitration has been a private form of dispute resolution in which only the parties could attend hearings, and the proceedings of which remained confidential.
2 In * senior Counsel, International Centre for settlement of Investment Disputes (ICsID). The views expressed herein are made in the author's personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the views of ICsID. This is an expanded version of a presentation made by the author at the 24 th Joint Colloquium on International Arbitration organized by the American Arbitration Association, the ICC and ICsID. Rules. This term is, however, interchangeable with the Latin expression amicus curiae, which I will also use in this paper. The expression "non-disputing Party" used in the 2004 U.s. Model BIT should for its part be distinguished from the one used in the ICsID Rules and Articles. In the former system, the "non-disputing Party" is a state Party to the BIT that is not involved in the dispute but which, under Article 28(2) of the Model BIT, is entitled to make oral and written submissions to the tribunal on the interpretation of the Treaty. In the latter system, the term "non-disputing party" refers to a person or entity that is neither a disputing party nor a party to the treaty on which consent to arbitration is based, that nevertheless has an interest in the dispute and can help the tribunals in their decision-making process by providing arguments and perspectives that the litigating parties have not supplied. These persons or entities can sometimes file amicus curiae submissions (see 2004 U.s. Model BIT, Art. 28(3)).
their introduction to their 1986 version of International Commercial Arbitration, Redfern and hunter described arbitration as "a private process, an advantage in the eyes of those who do not want details of their quarrels (accompanied almost inevitably by attacks on their competence or good faith) to be disclosed in open court, with the possibility of further publication elsewhere." 3 In the 2004 version, "confidentiality" was still praised as one of the attractive features of arbitration. however, the authors specified that "developments in the law and practice of arbitration over recent years have been such that the old certainties no longer exist and a fresh look has to be taken." 4 The "fresh look" in investment arbitration relates directly to the matter of "transparency," which includes making some documents available to the public, opening hearings to the public, and accepting amici submissions. 5 In the last decade, such activities have helped to cause investment arbitration to evolve from a relatively private process to one that is far more accessible to the public. To a certain extent, the original parties to investor-state arbitrations now often resemble Figaro and suzanne in Beaumarchais' comedic play The Marriage of Figaro, 7 since they are subjected to the views of different characters who claim an interest in the matter and who wish to get involved in the decision-making process.
This paper shall addresses the extent and limits of non-disputing party participation in nAFTA and ICsID arbitration proceedings, and show that a door is now open, even if not widely.
I. A DOOr IS OPeN …
To what extent is the door open to non-disputing parties? It is now widely established in the jurisprudence and institutional rules that non-disputing parties may make submissions to investor-state tribunals. since there already exists a well-developed literature on the subject, 9 I will only briefly recall the various cases in which questions of amicus participation have arisen, describe the normative framework erected for this subject, and address some practical matters with respect to the submission of amicus briefs. 
A. Jurisprudence
The question of admitting amicus briefs was first addressed in cases brought under Chapter Eleven of the north American Free Trade Agreement (the "nAFTA"). The first case in which amicus participation was requested was the Methanex v. USA case ("Methanex"). The tribunal issued a decision admitting such submissions in January 2001. 10 The tribunal indicated that nothing in the UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules or Chapter 11 expressly conferred upon an arbitral tribunal the power to accept or refuse amicus submissions.
11 The tribunal inferred its power to accept such submissions from Article 15(1) of the UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which provides that the tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate. 12 This view was later confirmed by the tribunal in the UPS v. Canada case. submissions on the ground that it was beyond the tribunal's power to do so in the absence of consent by the parties. 15 however, in the Aguas Argentinas, Suez and others v. Argentina case (hereinafter the Suez case), 16 the tribunal concluded that under Article 44 of the ICsID Convention it had the power to admit amicus curiae submissions from suitable non-parties in appropriate cases. 17 Article 44 provides that if a question of procedure arises which is not covered by the Convention or the Arbitration Rules, or by any rules agreed by the parties, the tribunal shall decide the question. As in the Methanex case, the tribunal found that the "acceptance of amicus submissions is a procedural question that does not affect a disputing party's substantive rights since the parties' rights remain the same both before and after the submission."
18 The tribunal also considered that "[t]he admission of an amicus curiae submission would fall within this definition of procedural question since it can be viewed as a step in assisting the Tribunal to achieve its fundamental task of arriving at a correct decision in this case." 19 The tribunal rejected the claimants' argument that the acceptance of amicus submissions was a procedural measure that would have substantive consequences since "the practical effect would be that the Claimants would end up litigating with entities which are not party to the arbitration agreement."
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The same conclusion was reached by a tribunal composed of the same members in a similar case involving almost the same parties (Aguas 
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In parallel to this jurisprudential evolution, and in response to nongovernmental organization (nGO) and media scrutiny, 22 the nAFTA Parties and the ICsID secretariat addressed the matter of non-disputing party submissions, the former by issuing an interpretative statement and the latter by amending its rules.
B. The normative framework
In October 2003, the nAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) issued a statement on non-disputing party participation (hereinafter called "FTC statement" or "statement"). 23 The FTC statement confirmed that no provision in the nAFTA limited a tribunal's discretion to accept non-disputing party submissions. 24 The statement also set out the procedures for amicus applications and the filing of such submissions. It is worth noting that the statement drew a clear distinction between the participation of "non-disputing parties," defined as persons or entities that are not a disputing party, and the participation of supra note 9, at 16 (stating that "[i]n fact, since the states' influence should stay limited, one needs to distinguish between nAFTA Parties and amici which can have more rights because this is to the proceeding's benefit"). See also Kinnear, supra note 6, at 8 (defining the role of the non-disputing states in investor-state dispute settlement, and pointing out that "[t]he first and most obvious reason for non-disputing states to participate is that they are party to the treaty that is being interpreted. As such, these states have the experience of having negotiated the treaty and have a unique perspective on how the treaty should be interpreted"). 25 to submit briefs on the interpretation of the nAFTA in the context of disputes to which it is not a party. 26 Before the issuance of the statement, some commentators compared the rights of the amici with those of the non-disputing nAFTA Parties, and concluded that the amici might indeed have more rights since they could possibly comment on the merits of the case rather than remain limited to questions of the interpretation of the nAFTA's provisions. 27 It seems more relevant to distinguish them than compare them, however, as they do not have the same purpose and objective. 28 The former approach is supported by section B(8) of the FTC statement, which provides that nondisputing nAFTA Parties may, pursuant to Article 1128, address any issues of the interpretation of the provisions of the nAFTA presented in the nondisputing party's submission. 29 Given the interest of the nAFTA Parties in ensuring that different tribunals adopt the same interpretation of the Agreement, the nAFTA Parties hold an automatic right to present their views on provisions of the nAFTA at both the jurisdictional and merits levels. allow a person or entity that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule called the 'non-disputing party') to file a written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to allow such a filing, the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to which: (a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties; (b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the scope of the dispute; (c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding. The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both parties are given an opportunity to present
The main purpose of an amicus participation, which is not automatically granted in the nAFTA system, is to bring a different perspective than that supplied by the parties to the dispute with respect to legal or factual issues. such different perspectives are usually from an environmental or human rights angle. It is interesting to note in this respect that in the most recent Chapter 11 nAFTA cases, the non-disputing Parties have exercised less frequently their right to file Article 1128 submissions, whereas nGOs and other civil society groups have continued often to request leave to submit amicus briefs. 30 Most of the provisions of Chapter 11 having been tested before tribunals, and the nAFTA Parties having expressed their views on these points, there appears now to be a diminished need for them to submit interpretations of the Agreement. Private groups having an interest in the subject matter of the dispute will, however, undoubtedly still wish to participate.
With respect to ICsID, the Centre incorporated a provision into its rule with the amendments which came into effect on April 10, 2006, so that under the new Arbitration Rule 37(2) a tribunal, after consulting both parties, may allow a non-disputing party to file written submissions. statement, non-disputing parties are defined as persons or entities that are not a party to a dispute. Thus, submissions may be accepted from a natural person, a juridical person, an nGO (even an unincorporated one) or a state. It is worth mentioning that during the consultation process concerning the amendments, certain governments expressed their strong preference for requiring the consent of both parties for the tribunal to allow amicus submissions. 32 The adopted amendment, however, leaves the decision to the tribunal and provides only for consultation with the parties. This reflects the practice established by tribunals operating under the ICsID Convention or the nAFTA that had accepted the filing of amicus briefs even if one party disagreed.
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While Arbitration Rule 37(2) allows tribunals to accept submissions by non-disputing parties if they meet certain criteria, it does not specify when and how petitions and submissions by non-disputing parties should be made. By comparison, the FTC statement contains more procedural provisions but does not provide guidance on the scheduling of applications or submissions of nondisputing parties. It is therefore worthwhile examining the practice which has been followed in the various cases and to give suggestions for future practice.
C. Practical aspects of amicus curiae submissions
Most of the time, tribunals are not used to dealing with requests to file amicus briefs, and ask the ICsID secretariat for guidance as to the practice of other tribunals in such respect. The main question relates to timing-when should petitions and submissions be made?
The answers depend upon the specific rules applicable to the proceeding. As will be developed under section II of this article, proceedings brought under The question thus arises as to the procedure to be followed by any potential non-disputing party-can it file a submission without an application, and does it need to follow the indications contained in the statement? This case relates to the impact on small-scale tobacco businesses of the Master settlement Agreement between various U.s. states and four major tobacco companies. The claimants are involved in the manufacture and sale of tobacco products. 36 Merrill, Investor's Response, supra note 27, at para. 16; Canada's Response to the Petition, letter of July 16, 2008, pp. 3-4, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/KinneartoTribunalshrybmanAmicusJuly162008.pdf Chapter 11 of the nAFTA permit broader access to the documents pertaining to the case than do other proceedings. 34 This facilitates and encourages the participation of non-disputing parties. In addition, disputes brought under the nAFTA are prone to involve matters of public interest. In consequence, amicus participation is usually to be expected.
The FTC statement provides recommendations on the procedures to be used for submissions. Although different procedures can be agreed by the parties, or decided by the tribunal, tribunals have until now followed the FTC recommendations. 35 In the Merrill case, for example, both parties invited the tribunal to follow the procedures set forth in the FTC statement. date by which the disputing parties comment on the application for leave to file a non-disputing party submission." section B(8) further provides that "the Tribunal will set an appropriate date by which the disputing parties may respond in writing to the non-disputing party submission."
The FTC recommends that the application be accompanied by the submission. 37 It seems odd at first glance to ask the non-disputing party to file its submission with its application for leave, since it is not certain that the non-disputing party will be granted such leave. however, the submission might be useful for the tribunal to have at hand when determining whether the nondisputing party meets the criteria required to file a written submission as set forth in the FTC statement's recommendations. The FTC statement also recommends specific procedural details concerning the length and format of the documents: 5 pages for the application, 38 20 pages (including annexes) for the submission, 39 with required dating and signature. 40 These procedural restrictions are meant to ensure the orderly conduct of the proceeding, which is one of the guiding principles specified by the FTC statement in its first section. 41 Another principle mentioned by the FTC statement is fairness. 42 This principle is reflected in the FTC's recommendations that the parties be given the right to comment on the application for leave to submit a written submission, and to respond in writing to the non-disputing party's submission. 43 such an introduction of additional rounds of pleadings can result in a significant extension of the proceedings. It is therefore important that the timing of any application and filing of a written submission, as well as possible responses thereto, be included in the calendar which the tribunal is to discuss with the parties.
With respect to the timing of applications and submissions, there are at least two questions which arise: (i) should they be allowed at the jurisdictional phase, if this phase takes place; and (ii) when should they be made during the merits phase, if reached? A review of some of the nAFTA cases involving amicus participation may help answer these questions. In the UPS case, the amici unsuccessfully attempted to file submissions as early as the jurisdictional stage 44 44 The tribunal opined that questions of jurisdiction and the place of arbitration were not "among the matters on which it is appropriate for the Petitioners to make submissions," since the parties "are fully able to present the competing contentions" on both of these issues and "in significant degree have already done so." 45 Thus, a general rule may be seen that in nAFTA cases, amicus submissions are admitted during the merits stage of the proceeding. In the Glamis 46 and Merrill cases, the question did not arise since the request to bifurcate the jurisdictional and merits stages was not granted. 47 This does not mean, however, that amicus briefs will automatically be excluded at the jurisdictional phase. Indeed, in the Glamis case, one of the amici included comments on the jurisdictional objections in its submission. 48 As a general rule, in order to make sure that the amici curiae are, in fact, contributing a different perspective to the arbitration and are addressing the matters within the scope of the dispute, and since they have access to the pleadings, it is logical that their submissions be made after the first round of pleadings on the merits (i.e. the memorial and counter-memorial) has been exchanged. This allows the non-disputing parties to know the arguments of the disputing parties, avoid repetition, and make relevant arguments in relation to the issues raised by the disputing parties.
In the Glamis case, the Quechan Indian nation, an American Indian tribe, filed an application for leave to file a non-party submission (with the submission included) in August 2005, before the submissions of the main pleadings by 49 the parties. 49 The Quechan Indian nation did so as requested by the tribunal, but along with other non-disputing parties requested the tribunal to reconsider this decision since it made it more difficult to submit meaningful discussions.
Glamis
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During a procedural hearing in October 2005, the parties "acknowledged the concerns of the non-disputing parties and agreed that non-party submissions could be filed contemporaneously with any Article 1128 filings […] scheduled to be filed approximately one month following the submission of Respondent's Counter-Memorial."
51 As a result of this new schedule, the Quechan Indian nation submitted a second amicus brief-a supplemental submission-in which it addressed the issues raised by the parties in their written pleadings.
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In particular, it argued that Glamis's Expert Cultural Report was fatally flawed and could not be relied upon by the tribunal.
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Filing applications and submissions after the counter-memorial also presents the advantage of not adding a round of pleadings for the parties since they can incorporate their comments in the second round of exchanges (i.e. the reply and rejoinder). This type of scheduling therefore avoids a disruption of the proceeding and ensures that neither party is unduly burdened or unfairly prejudiced by such filings. It is the duty of tribunals under the FTC statement to avoid such when accepting amicus briefs. ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both parties are given an opportunity to present their observations on the non-disputing party submission." 56 The non-disputing parties are placed in a different situation. As will be explained below, they usually do not have access to the documents of the case (such as the request for arbitration and memorials). Consequently, whether the non-disputing parties file their submissions after the first round of exchanges or after the second round does not make much difference for them. Another distinction with proceedings under the nAFTA is that the ICsID Rules do not provide for a simultaneous filing of the application and the submission. Thus, the submission of the amicus brief can be scheduled months after the application is made. The task of the tribunal is to establish a schedule that is the least disruptive for the disputing parties.
The first amicus submission under the 2006 ICsID Arbitration Rules was made in Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United republic of Tanzania.
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The case concerned a water and sewerage infrastructure project in Dar es salaam, Tanzania. In november 2006, five nGOs filed a "Petition for Amicus Curiae status," 58 contending that the case involved issues related to sustainable development, the environment, human rights and governmental policy in which they held expertise. They also requested access to the key arbitral documents and to the oral hearings. having considered the written observations filed by the disputing parties on these petitions, the tribunal found that it could benefit from a submission by the petitioners and that allowing such submission would also secure wider confidence in the arbitral process.
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The tribunal adopted a two-stage approach. In the first instance, the petitioners were jointly given the right to file a single, initial written submission after the exchange of memorials between the disputing parties but three weeks before the hearing. The submission had to articulate whatever arguments, and provide whatever information, the petitioners considered appropriate, but was limited to a maximum of 50 double-spaced pages. The submission was not to include any attached evidence or documentation, but could identify any such material that the petitioners might wish to introduce at a later stage. If the 60 Id. at para. 60. 61 Biwater, Procedural Order no. 6 (relating to the amici and post-hearing briefs) ( 10/21/tribunal-prepares-for-amici-curiae-in-miners-dispute-with-south-africa.aspx tribunal considered that it needed to be provided with such documentation, it would request it from the petitioners on its own initiative.
After the filing of the submission, the disputing parties would be given the opportunity, if they so desired, to address or respond to the petitioners' written submission. The tribunal would subsequently issue procedural directions for responses from both disputing parties to the written submissions, as well as for any further written submissions, documents or evidence to be obtained from the petitioners as the tribunal deemed appropriate. 60 The disputing parties chose in the event to address the issues raised by the petitioners in their final oral submissions at the hearing. Following the hearing, the tribunal decided that no further intervention by the amici was necessary. 61 Inasmuch as the parties and the tribunal know that the dispute is likely to trigger a non-disputing party's interest, more specific measures can be agreed upon by the disputing parties during the organizational first session, 62 or be established by the tribunal in a procedural order after the first session.
In a case registered under the ICsID Additional Facility Rules, Piero Foresti and others v. South Africa, 63 a civil society group in south Africa indicated before the constitution of the tribunal that it was contemplating filing an amicus application given certain human-rights implications of the dispute. The dispute related to a change in the minerals legislation of south Africa which allegedly affected the claimants' rights. The new Act in question included requirements with respect to participation and ownership by historically disadvantaged south Africans. 64 This matter was discussed at the first session, following which the disputing parties agreed on the text of a brief document summarizing the dispute and outlining the steps to be taken by any interested non-disputing party wishing to file an amicus submission in the case. The document, having been made available through the ICsID secretariat at the request of potential nondisputing parties, was sent to two interested groups but no application has been made as at the time of the writing of this article. 66 Suez Order of 2007, supra note 16, at para. 27.
Procedural order in anonymous ICsID case (unpublished). 67 Mourre, 68 supra note 6, at 266-270.
The document did not specify format requirements for applications and submissions, although the tribunal had made some suggestions in this respect. Tribunals can set such limits, and in fact, it is desirable that for submissions, the maximum length be specified and other criteria be set in advance to avoid any disruption of the proceedings. such procedural safeguards were put in place in the Suez case. That tribunal established a deadline before which the amicus submission was to be filed electronically. The length of the submission was limited to 30 double-spaced pages, and the text to 12-point font. It was not envisaged that any supporting documents would be submitted. Rather, it was provided that, should the tribunal wish to consult any document referred to in the submission, it would request a copy from the petitioners. 66 In a more recent case which shall remain nameless, the tribunal decided that the submission would be limited in scope to specific issues, be filed by a certain date, and not exceed 30 pages (including annexes), in font size 12, with 1.5 line-spacing. 67 The tribunal applied to the disputing parties' written answers to the amicus brief the same format conditions applied to the non-disputing party's submission.
Beyond procedural safeguards, further conditions determined by the case law and other norms must be met for petitioners to be granted the right to file submissions. This leads to the second part of this article, which relates to the limits of non-disputing party participation.
II. … BUT NOT WIDe OPeN
The intervention of amici curiae in investment arbitration has raised concerns as to legitimacy and fairness. 68 Limits have been established by both tribunals and norms to address these concerns, to the point that the impact of such interventions can be questioned. Before describing these limits and examining the impact of non-disputing parties' interventions, two preliminary remarks are in order.
A. Two preliminary remarks
First, it is relevant to reflect on the reasons behind the evolution towards transparency, as they will help to explain the nature of the limits that have been adopted for non-disputing party interventions. One reason is the greater access to instantaneous information now enjoyed by citizens. A second reason is that ICsID tribunals invariably deal with matters of public interest, such as the distribution 69 See, e.g., the Suez and Biwater cases.
Bennaim-selvi, 70 supra note 2, at 777. 71 See, e.g., Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 6, at 335; Kinnear, supra note 6, at 2; and Yannacasmall, supra note 6, at 41, 48. See also the statement by the OECD Investment Committee (June 2005): "There is a general understanding among the Members of the Investment Committee that additional transparency, in particular in relation to the publication of arbitral awards, subject to necessary safeguards for the protection of confidential business and governmental information, is desirable to enhance effectiveness and public acceptance of international investment arbitration, as well as contributing to the further development of a public body of jurisprudence. Members of the Investment Committee generally share the view that, especially insofar as proceedings raise important issues of public interest, it may also be desirable to allow third party participation, subject however to clear and specific guidelines." (Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/3/34786913.pdf ) 72 Suez Order of 2005, supra note 17, at para. 22. 73 See, e.g., Depalma, supra note 22. It may be noted that the issue of releasing documents had been raised in the early cases filed against the United states under the nAFTA, as U.s. domestic law mandated the release of documents except under special circumstances. In Loewen Group, Inc. and raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICsID Case no. ARB(AF)/98/3, the United states informed the other side and the tribunal that it had received requests for information about the case, including requests for the release of pleadings and minutes of sessions, under the U.s. Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, and that it intended to be responsive to such requests. The claimants opposed the release of any information. The tribunal issued two rulings on this issue in 2000, directing the parties not to release minutes of hearings but acknowledging nevertheless that while the ICsID Convention and Rules prohibited the parties from publishing the minutes and records of the hearing, the tribunal "could not affect or qualify any statute-imposed obligation of disclosure by which a party to the arbitration might be bound." In other words, the tribunal accepted that the FOIA placed obligations on the U.s. Government to release information about the pending ICsID arbitration, and that the tribunal could not prevent such releases. Therefore, from that point on, the U.s. released all pleadings introduced into that proceeding. See M. stevens, "Confidentiality Revisited," 17 news from ICsID 1, at 10 (hereinafter stevens). of water. 69 Decisions in these cases have the potential, directly or indirectly, to affect persons beyond those immediately involved as the disputing parties. Most obviously, awards adverse to states must be paid from public funds. 70 In this context, transparency helps to ensure the credibility and viability of the investorstate dispute mechanism. 71 To quote the tribunal in the Suez case:
The acceptance of amicus submissions would have the additional desirable consequence of increasing the transparency of investor-state arbitration. Public acceptance of the legitimacy of international arbitral processes, particularly when they involve states and matters of public interest, is strengthened by increased openness and increased knowledge as to how these processes function. 79 UPS Decision, supra note 13, at para. 43; Merrill tribunal letter, supra note 35, which specifies that "if the meaning of the petition is to request the granting of the status of a disputing party or an analogous status to the entities you represent, the Tribunal lacks the jurisdictional authority to do so either under nAFTA Chapter 11 or the UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules governing these proceedings. such status is expressly restricted to a 'Party and an Investor of Another Party. '" in an investor-state proceeding, and that no provision in the nAFTA precluded the disputing parties from providing public access to documents submitted to an investor-state tribunal. 74 In addition, in October 2003, the U.s. and Canada publicly stated their intent to consent to open hearings. 75 Mexico joined this consensus in July 2004. 76 As a result, non-disputing parties now have broad access to documents and hearings in nAFTA proceedings.
nevertheless, even under nAFTA proceedings, third-party rights are delimited, as shall now be discussed.
B. Four limits 1. Not a party per se
The first and foremost limit on non-disputing party interventions is that the non-disputing parties are not parties per se, but instead mere participants at most. The term "non-disputing party" has been criticized as misleading, 77 but it is the one used in several instruments in the investment arbitration field, such as the FTC statement, the Canadian Model BIT and the ICsID Rules. 78 nevertheless, in all cases in which petitioners have requested to be added as "parties," the tribunal has refused to grant the request. 79 In addition, when tribunals have granted leave to file amicus briefs, they have been careful to specify that this permission did not mean that the non-disputing party was then entitled to all the rights granted to the disputing parties. In the Biwater case, the tribunal 80 Biwater, Procedural Order no. 5, supra note 59, at para. 46. 81 Id. at para. 47. 82 Id. at para. 64. See also Suez Order of 2005, supra note 17, at para. 13: "In short, a request to act as amicus curiae is an offer of assistance-an offer that the decision maker is free to accept or reject. An amicus curiae is a volunteer, a friend of the court, not a party." wrote that "it also follows that a 'non-disputing party' does not become a party to the arbitration by virtue of a tribunal's decision under Rule 37, but is instead afforded a specific and defined opportunity to make a particular submission." 80 The tribunal added that it "consider[ed] this an important starting point in terms of safeguarding the expectations of all concerned, as well as the integrity of the arbitral process, lest it be misunderstood that once any type of permission to participate is given to a non-disputing party, the latter may then be entitled as of right to all other procedural rights and privileges." 81 The tribunal further stated that it was not expected that the petitioners "(a) [would] consider themselves as simply in the same position as either party's lawyers, or (b) that they [would] see their role as suggesting to the Arbitral Tribunal how issues of fact or law as presented by the parties ought to be determined (which is the sole mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal itself )." 
Conditions to be met for filing an amicus submission
The second important limit on non-disputing party interventions is that requests to file submissions are not granted automatically but rather on the basis of met conditions. The new ICsID Arbitration Rule 37(2) makes clear that a tribunal, in deciding on a request for an intervention, shall take into consideration three elements: (a) whether the non-disputing party would assist the tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties; (b) the extent to which the nondisputing party submission would address a matter within the scope of the dispute; and (c) the extent to which the non-disputing party would have a significant interest in the proceeding. similar criteria can be found in the FTC statement 83 and in the Canadian Model BIT. 84 These criteria are meant to allow tribunals to grant amicus status on an ad hoc basis, with the effect that nGOs or civil society groups involved in environmental or human rights issues will not be automatically granted a right to file an application in cases having such implications. 85 Suez Order of May 2005, supra note 17, at para. 28. 86 See Working Paper, supra note 31, at 11. The proposed Rule 37(2) reads as follows: "(2) After consulting both parties as far as possible, the Tribunal may allow a person or a state that is not a party to the dispute (hereafter called the 'non-disputing party') to file a written submission with the Tribunal."
Antonietti,
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supra note 32, at 435. With respect to the breadth of the term "entity," it is interesting to note that the European has not yet arisen under the new ICsID Rules, if there is a bifurcation of the proceeding between jurisdiction and the merits, tribunals are likely to refuse non-disputing parties' submissions on jurisdictional questions. since ICsID jurisdictional proceedings typically relate to the interpretation of the ICsID Convention or the document establishing consent, and involve information specific to the parties, such as nationality, it is difficult to envisage a situation where non-disputing parties would be able to bring a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that would be different from that of the disputing parties.
Indeed, although the new ICsID Rules were not applicable to the Suez case, the tribunal in that case concluded that it was "fully informed on these issues and that amicus curiae submissions on jurisdictional questions would not be appropriate, under the standards set forth … above, as they would not assist the Tribunal in its task of assessing jurisdiction."
85 It seems that the tribunal was referring in particular to the criterion of the non-disputing party's suitability to act as amicus curiae in view of its expertise and experience. This standard presaged that of ICsID Arbitration Rule 37(2)(a). similarly, the tribunal in Suez did not completely close the door to the would-be amicus on this ground, and the ICsID Rules likewise do not contain such a block.
One can imagine that a state Party to a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty-on which consent is often based-but which is not a party to the dispute, could ask to file a submission concerning the treaty's travaux préparatoires and the interpretation of the treaty's provisions in relation to jurisdictional matters. states were in fact envisaged by the ICsID secretariat as potential non-disputing parties during the 2006 rule-amendment process.
In the version of the draft ICsID Rule amendments circulated for comments, the proposed text for Arbitration Rule 37(2) included the words "person or state." 86 This wording was, however, found to be too restrictive by some commentators. 87 As a result, the amended version of Rule 37(2) was changed to "a person or entity." Obviously, the term "entity" is less restrictive and encompasses states. authorities that a violation of a commitment of the kind described above should be subject to the dispute settlement procedures of the BIT." Mealey's, supra note 89, at E3. 91 See UPS Decision, supra note 13, at para. 62; Methanex Decision, supra note 10, at para. 38. Both are quoted by Mourre, supra note 6, at 268.
As to the merits of non-disputing state involvement, an issue could arise if the non-disputing state were to have an interpretation similar to that of the private claimants. It could be argued in such case that the non-disputing state was espousing the claim of the requesting party in violation of the principle established by the ICsID Convention.
89 It could also be argued by the Respondent state that there was a dispute as to the interpretation of the treaty which should be dealt with under the state-state dispute settlement provision of that treaty. 90 Finally, one could imagine that if a non-disputing state were to be authorized to file such a submission, the parties or the tribunal might wish to hear the testimony of the amicus to determine the weight of its arguments. non-disputing parties do not, however, have the status of witnesses or experts, as has been recalled by several tribunals. 91 It will thus be for tribunals to ascertain the independence of the petitioner, decide on whether to admit the submission, and give it the weight it deserves. With respect to the second criterion, "addressing a matter within the scope of the dispute," it bears pointing out that if the respondent has not objected to jurisdiction, a non-disputing party would not be allowed to file a submission on jurisdictional issues as it would be outside the scope of the dispute. In the AeS-Hungary case, the tribunal granted the European Commission leave to file a submission, but decided with respect to the allowed topics for discussion that the European Commission could not address jurisdictional issues as no such objections had been raised.
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With respect to the last criterion established by Rule 37(2), it may be noted simply that the petitioner needs to show that it has more than a "general" interest in the proceeding. For example, it must demonstrate that the outcome of the proceeding may have a direct or indirect impact on the rights or principles it represents and defends. The Quechan Indian nation's intervention in the Glamis case (admittedly one not heard under the ICsID Rules) provides a good illustration of an amicus with a significant interest in the proceeding. In its application of August 2005, the Quechan Indian nation argued that it had a significant interest in the arbitration since the project in question, if carried out, would significantly affect the life of their community by damaging their sacred sites.
In brief, the criteria set forth in the ICsID Rules are tools that tribunals can use to find a balance between the interests of the public, the parties and the proceeding.
In addition, it is to be noted that Arbitration Rule 37 does not contain an exhaustive inventory of conditions. The way the rule is drafted-"the Tribunal shall consider, among other things"-and the conditions set forth in Rule 37(2), (a) through (c), authorize a tribunal to add further conditions. For instance, the FTC statement requires disclosure of whether or not the non-disputing party has any affiliation with any of the disputing parties, and also requires the identification of any government, person or organization that has provided financial or other assistance in preparing the submission.
Reference may also be made to the criteria used by ICsID tribunals, such as those applied in the Suez case: (a) the appropriateness of the subject matter of the case to a non-disputing party intervention; (b) the suitability of a given non-disputing party to act as an amicus curiae in the case; and (c) the procedure by which the amicus submission is to be made and considered. 93 Regarding the second criterion, the Suez tribunal took three factors into consideration, i.e. 94 Id. at para. 24. 95 Id. at para. 25. amici have expressed concern that amicus participation in investor-state arbitration is exclusively pro-government and anti-investor. Although amici do often present arguments similar to those of the respondent state, it is the author's opinion that they should be expected to present their own arguments in an independent way. There is at least one example of an amicus who developed arguments closer to those articulated by the claimant. See Glamis, submission of the national Mining Association (October 13, 2006) , supra note 30. On such matters, see also Kinnear, supra note 6, at 7.
98 See stevens, supra note 73, at 8. It should also be noted that there have been mixed reactions to transparency. The Bretton Woods Project (describing itself as "critical voices of the World Bank and IMF") reported in one of its articles, "secretive World Bank tribunal confronts calls to open up," that the proposal for transparency made by ICsID in its Working Paper had triggered mixed reactions. The south Centre, an intergovernmental think tank based in Geneva representing the views of southern country governments, is reported to have expressed opposition: "[The south Centre] questions the authority of the secretariat to make such proposals. south Centre argues that greater transparency would act against the interests of southern governments by facilitating the participation of developed country organisations and interest groups with far greater resources. They also assert that it will increase the costs of arbitration. Finally, they defended the idea that arbitration is a 'private dispute resolution process'. This reflects the opinion of some southern government representatives who do not want to disclose classified information." (Article available at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-236015). In the context of UnCITRAL's effort to revise its Arbitration Rules, the Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its forty-eighth session underlined "the desirability of dealing with transparency in investorexpertise, experience and independence. 94 The tribunal further required that the petition include the following information: (i) the identity and background of the petitioner, the nature of its membership, whether it was an organization, and the nature of its relationships, if any, to the disputing parties; (ii) the nature of the petitioner's interest in the case; (iii) whether the petitioner had received financial or other material support from any of the parties or from any person connected with the parties in the case; and (iv) the reasons why the tribunal should accept the petitioner's amicus brief. 95 The same types of procedural requirements can be found in the FTC statement. 96 The aim of these criteria is to ensure that the petitioner will truly be a "friend of the court" as opposed to a friend of a party or a friend simply to its own interests. 
No access to arbitration documents
The third limit concerns access to documents. Although transparency is quite developed for ICsID proceedings when compared to other arbitral institutions or other sets of rules, maintaining the confidentiality of the proceeding remains the general rule. 98 Under the ICsID Convention, Rules and Regulations, there is no provision allowing for the publication of the case records without the state arbitration, which differed from purely private arbitration, where confidentiality was an essential feature." UnCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), A/Cn.9/646 (48 th sess., september [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 2008) , at para. 57, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/ working_groups/2Arbitration.html. The Report also indicated that "[r]eservations were expressed by many delegations in respect of the possible inclusion of provisions on transparency in the UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules because it was necessary to preserve the generic nature of the Rules and it was not certain that full transparency was in all circumstances desirable." (Id. at para. 60.) Mention was made of the statement by the Milan Club of Arbitrators, attached as Annex II to the Report, suggesting that consideration be given to preparation of "one or more optional clauses to address specific factors for investor-state arbitration taking place under investment protection treaties for consideration by states when negotiating such treaties." (Id.) In the Annoted Provisional Agenda of the fiftieth session (A/Cn.9/ WG.II/WP.153), available at the same address, the status of the question of transparency was summarized as follows at para. 18: "[T]he Commission agreed that the topic of transparency in investor-state treatybased arbitration was worthy of future consideration and should be dealt with as a matter of priority immediately after completion of the current revision of the UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules. … The Commission decided that it was too early to make a decision on the form of a future instrument on treatybased arbitration and that broad discretion should be left to the Working Group in that respect." Finally, it is worth noting that the Iran-U.s. Claims Tribunal, which has incorporated the UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules in its Rules of Procedure, has expressly allowed for amicus submissions from non-parties in its note shall maintain, in accordance with rules to be promulgated by him, separate Registers for requests for conciliation and requests for arbitration. In these he shall enter all significant data concerning the institution, conduct and disposition of each proceeding, including in particular the method of constitution and the membership of each Commission, Tribunal and Committee. On the Arbitration Register he shall also enter, with respect to each award, all significant data concerning any request for the supplementation, rectification, interpretation, revision or annulment of the award, and any stay of enforcement." consent of both parties. 99 The Rule amendments of 2006 did not change this principle. The consent of both parties is still required for the publication of the award in its entirety. 100 In the absence of such consent, the amendment to Arbitration Rule 48 merely rendered prompt and systematic the already permitted publication of case excerpts dealing with legal conclusions.
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ICsID's transparency rules relate also to information on the registration of cases and the status of proceedings. Under Administrative and Financial Regulation 23, the secretary-General is required to enter in the register established for each case all significant data concerning the institution, conduct and disposition of the case. 102 Most of these entries are now reflected in the 103 See, e.g., the Suez and Biwater cases quoted on several occasions in this article. There is one ICsID case, Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICsID Case no. ARB/05/10, where the parties agreed to have the main pleadings of the original arbitration proceeding published on ICsID's website, (available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICsID/Frontservlet?requestType=CasesRh&actionval=viewPle adings). It may be noted that the exhibits to the pleadings, as well as the evidentiary submissions, were not included in this publication. Given that the aim is to further the development of international law, it is not necessary to have access to annexes, witness statements or technical expert reports which are concerned with the particulars of the dispute at hand. It could be argued that legal opinions would be useful to have, but most of the time, the main conclusions of these opinions are included in the text of the pleadings. 104 Suez Order of 2007, supra note 16, at para. 25.
procedural details available on the website of the secretariat under each pending case. These procedural details are also published in the ICSID Annual reports and News from ICSID. In some cases, the parties consent to the publication of the procedural orders, decisions and award. 103 however, in order to file informed submissions, petitioners usually wish to have more than such general information, and usually request access to the underlying documents, that is to say the request for arbitration and the pleadings. Tribunals have considered that in view of the petitioner's role, which is to offer its views on general or broad policy issues, the information needed is usually in the public domain and thus access to the record is not warranted. To quote the Suez tribunal, "it must be emphasized that the role of an amicus curiae is not to challenge arguments or evidence put forward by the Parties. This is the Parties' role. The role of the Petitioners in their capacity as amicus curiae is to provide their perspective, expertise and arguments to help the court."
104 As explained by the tribunal, in the Suez case the petitioners could rely on the decision on jurisdiction, made available on the ICsID website, which contained information about the nature of the claims entered. similar issues have been posed by most of the cases brought against Argentina based on the measures taken in response to the financial crisis of the late 1990s. The decisions and awards rendered in these cases are generally made available to the public. This accessibility can facilitate the non-disputing parties' task of getting information on the types of issues raised by the disputing parties. In circumstances where it would be extremely difficult for non-disputing parties to gain information on the case, it could be appropriate to ask the disputing parties to summarize the facts, issues and arguments while not disclosing confidential information, which is the concern usually expressed by the parties in refusing access to documents.
Under nAFTA proceedings, the situation is different. Documents of general public interest are made available on the Internet, so petitioners thereby gain 114 See Legum, supra note 6, at 350; Kinnear, supra note 6, at 3.
No access to arbitral hearings
The fourth limit, which is linked to the third one, relates to access to arbitral hearings. If the parties have not consented to grant access to the documents, they will most likely also refuse to allow access to the hearings. Under the former ICsID Arbitration Rule 32(2), the tribunal would decide, with the consent of the disputing parties, who other than the disputing parties and their representatives might attend the hearings. 110 The amended Rule 32(2) now provides that unless either disputing party objects, the tribunal may allow non-disputing parties to attend or observe all or part of the hearing. 111 The draft text of the amendment originally provided the wording "after consultation […] with the parties as far as possible," thus enabling the tribunal to circumvent the objection of one party. 112 however, in view of concerns expressed, the final draft incorporates the language "unless either party objects." no such consent has ever been given by both disputing parties in an ICsID case. Consequently, the tribunals have had to refuse such access when requested.
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In nAFTA proceedings, as mentioned earlier, the hearings on jurisdiction and on the merits are now commonly opened to the public as the nAFTA Parties have insisted on such open hearings. In order to avoid any disruption of the hearing, the proceedings are broadcast in a separate room for public viewing.
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The closed-circuit television feed from the hearing room is interrupted whenever confidential information is referred to. In order to indicate in advance the parts of the hearing which will be closed to the public, the ICsID secretariat asks This system has been used to broadcast the oral arguments of the parties before the supreme the parties to identify, to the extent possible, which parts of their presentations, and which witness and expert testimonies, are likely to include confidential information. This usually creates additional work for the secretariat, which regularly informs those attendees who have provided their e-mail addresses as to the schedule of the hearing and the approximate times when the hearing will be open or closed to the public.
In the Glamis case, even different types of confidentiality had to be taken into account. One related to business information and the other related to the sacred sites. Confidential business information was kept from both the amici and the other members of the public. Matters related to the location of the sacred sites could be viewed by the representatives of the Quechan Indian nation, but not by the other attendees from the public. In order to render the bifurcated system effective, a separate room was allocated to the representatives of the Quechan Indian nation.
Experience shows that attendance by the public is usually limited. In the Glamis case, where the hearing on the merits took place in August and september 2007, a total of 20 persons, including members of the public and of non-disputing parties, observed the 9-day hearing.
It is likely that if hearings were transmitted via the Internet, there would be more viewers. Even though it is technically feasible to do this, 115 it is quite costly and presents security challenges. so far, parties have accepted the relatively small additional cost of broadcasting hearings by closed-circuit television, but it is not certain that they would consent to absorbing more substantial costs. After all, they could make the argument that if an amicus has a truly significant interest in the proceeding, it should be willing to make the necessary trip and bear the related travel costs. This would, however, again raise the issue of the additional costs of arbitration which are triggered by the participation of the amicus, and the more general impact of its participation on the proceeding.
C. The impact of non-disputing party participation: a façade?
Extending the proceedings beyond the disputing parties undeniably has procedural consequences, as has been seen above. There is also the question of whether it has substantive consequences.
Consultations with the parties concerning would-be and accepted amici inevitably add to the parties' work and counsel fees. Most of the time, parties are consulted at three stages. First, when a potential non-disputing party expresses its interest in filing a submission, if the question has not been raised before, the parties may comment on the procedure that non-disputing parties are to follow in filing applications and submissions. second, after the would-be non-disputing party applies for leave to file a submission, the parties are solicited for comments on whether the potential amicus has met the enunciated standards. Third, after the amicus has filed its submission, the parties can comment on the arguments contained therein. The involvement of amici also entails additional fees for the arbitrators, who will review all of the documents submitted and issue procedural orders or decisions in respect of the amici. These additional costs seem to be the necessary price to pay in order to render the international arbitral system more legitimate through transparency. 116 But is such transparency really just a façade? some fear that amici wield too much power. They could raise arguments which could broaden the scope of the dispute.
117 They are also not subject to cross-examination. 118 such fears, however, impute more power to the amici than they have in reality. With respect to expanding the scope of the dispute, the ICsID Rules clearly state that the non-disputing party's submission must address matters within the scope of the dispute. 119 The tribunal can also direct the non-disputing party as to the subject matters it can develop. 120 Finally, tribunals positive light the evolution in favor of greater transparency and participation, it may be too early to give a definitive response to such a question.
COnCLUsIOn
The norms and case law of international arbitration have established legitimate safeguards for handling the phenomenon of amicus participation. These safeguards preserve the integrity of the arbitral process while improving its public credibility. To date, there is no record of any abuse of this system. At the same time, there is also no evidence that non-disputing parties have actually assisted the decision-making of tribunals. To come back to the parallel to literature made in the introduction, in spite of all the different characters who interfere in the play, Figaro and suzanne end up getting married as originally planned. There was an impact on the process, but not on the end result.
